How to win friends and influence Washington
By Thomas Axworthy

The United States carries such disproportionate weight in today's world that the cliché of "superpower" no longer applies. It is a hyperpower, which is why in every foreign chancellery across the globe, politicians and diplomats are anxiously assessing what a George Bush II presidency will mean for their bilateral relations and for the international system as a whole.

Canada has more at stake than most. We share a border of 6,500 kilometres and 80 per cent of our exports go to the United States. Our territory has always been a vital consideration in American defence planning. When Americans think of us, they usually do so benignly: When I arrived at Harvard years ago, one hostess greeted me with, "You are just like us except you have health insurance and gun control, a Minnesota writ large."

To maintain or even strengthen this generally harmonious relationship with the world's indisputable power is the No. 1 priority for Canada's new Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley. Influencing the hyperpower, however, isn't easy.

Washington has many power centres, but three stand out. The White House is the personal instrument of the president. His staff's primary job is to defend the president's political interests; Bill Clinton's White House was quick to sacrifice the Democrats in Congress in order to secure the president's re-election.

Next, there's the permanent government of the "great and good" of the Washington beltway. Here ambitious individuals begin in junior jobs in one administration, serve in law firms or think tanks when their party is out of power, and then return to senior positions in a restoration. Dick Cheney, White House chief of staff for Gerald Ford, returned to become George Bush I's secretary of defence; now he's Vice-President for George Bush II.

Congress is the third side of the Washington power triangle. Senators and key members of the House of Representatives are independent powers. Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina, chairman of the Senate foreign-relations committee, is as important as the secretary of state.

To influence the new Bush administration, Canada will have to win allies in each of these three power centres. In dealing with the first Reagan administration (which was far more ideological than the Bush team), Canada's ambassador Allan Gotlieb cultivated Michael Deaver of the White House staff; Allan MacEachen, then our foreign minister, who had gone to graduate school with George Shultz, then secretary of state, established rapport with his old schoolmate. Visiting Canadian ministers always made it a point to visit key Congressional leaders such as senators George Mitchell of Maine or Lloyd Bentsen of Texas. To win in Washington, you need a multi-layered strategy; the support of the president is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success.

And credit must be built up on some files so that it can be drawn down on others. Three issues come to mind. First, Canada can never, ever, be a security threat to the United States. The permanent government officials you want most on side are from the security establishment: the CIA, State Department, Pentagon, and the National Security Council.

And the most critical threat to the United States today is not missiles from North Korea but suitcase terrorism. A year ago, an Algerian terrorist arrived at Port Angeles, Wash., from Vancouver in a car loaded with bomb-making ingredients. Chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction can now fit in a trunk. More than any other single issue, Canada must be at the forefront of efforts to police our mutual borders. On terrorism, Canada must do its part.

Secretary of State Colin Powell's doctrine on intervention states that the United States should be involved only when critical national interests are at stake, when overwhelming force can be applied, and when troops can get out quickly once the job is done. This means that if the European Union, the United Nations, or individual states such as Canada feel strongly about "humanitarian" intervention, the United States won't stand in the way but won't take part, either.

Canada should devote sufficient resources to national defence and foreign affairs to ensure that we can carry out the active peacekeeping role that we usually espouse. To be credible in Washington, we must marry resources to intent. For too long, we've run a foreign and defence policy on the cheap.

Lastly, the Republican leaders in Congress are dedicated free traders. Here, Canada and the United States can make common cause. We must have a vigorous economic diplomacy that sees Canada exploring free-trade pacts with the EU, Japan, and South America. We should always be ahead, never behind, the United States on the trade agenda.

Antiterrorism, a robust defence policy, and expanded free trade are in Canada's best interests. These issues should be on our policy agenda in any case. Better yet, they respond to the concerns of the Washington power triangle. Sensitivity, not subservience, must be our lodestar in dealing with this indispensable nation.

Thomas S. Axworthy is adjunct lecturer at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and was principal secretary to Pierre Trudeau from 1981 to 1984. 

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